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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether stock overreaction behaviour in Malaysian stock market is 
sensitive to the length of the formation period. Using the basic framework of De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985), this study find that stock overreaction behaviour in this market is sensitive to 
the length of the formation period. Significant evidence of stock overreaction effect is 
documented in the longer formation period of up to 5-year, while for the medium formation 
period of 2-year, there is no clear evidence of stock overreaction behaviour. Evidence of 
stock overreaction behaviour is also reported for the shorter-term of 1-year, however, it may 
not be economically profitable after taken into account the transaction cost. This study also 
shows that size cannot explain the documented overreaction effect. However, the results 
suggest that the overreaction effect subsided after adjustment to time-varying risk.  
 
1. Introduction 
Stock market behaviour has become a popular topic of study in finance research. Recent 
evidence of behavioural finance for example overreaction and underreaction (De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1985, 1987; Fung, 1999; Mun Vasconcellos and Kish, 2000 Lai et. al, 2003; among 
them), have becoming a challenge to EMH. One of them is the seminal work of De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) which suggest the possibility of overreaction behaviour in the prices of 
stock. Many studies have been spurred from these findings such as Otchere and Chan (2003), 
Gaunt (2000), Fung (1999) and many others. Zarowin (1990) argues that the stock 
overreaction behaviour documented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) is due to size effect 
whereas Chan (1988) asserts that the time-varying risk factor is the cause of stock 
overreaction. However, De Bondt and Thaler (1987), and Lai et. al (2003) report that 
overreaction effect is not a manifestation of size and risk effect. Other study by Kryzanowski 
and Zhang (1992), Campbell and Limmack (1997) and Saleh (2007) focus on the sensitivity 
of overreaction effect to the length of the formation period while Chen and Sauer (1997) 
stress on the persistent of overreaction behaviour overtime. In Malaysia, evidence of stock 
British Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences                      43 
November 2011, Vol. 2 (2) 
 
 
© 2011 British Journals ISSN 2048-125X 
 
overreaction behaviour are documented by Hameed and Ting (2000), Ahmad and Hussain 
(2001) and Lai, Guru and Fauzias (2003). Their results are robust in which risk, size and 
seasonality effects cannot explain the stock overreaction observed in Malaysian stock market. 
Although evidences of stock overreaction have been documented by previous studies in 
Malaysia, there is no study thus far that look at the sensitivity of the length of the formation 
period on the return behaviour of Malaysian stock market. Saleh (2007) as well as Campbell 
and Limmack (1997) show that stock overreaction behaviour in Jordan and UK stock market 
is sensitive to the length of the formation period. However, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) 
find that it does not matter in Canadian stock market. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate whether stock overreaction behaviour in Bursa Malaysia is sensitive to the length 
of the formation period. Finding of this study is important as it can help to provide guidelines 
for investors to take advantage on the stock overreaction behaviour in Malaysian stock 
market. 
 
2. Methodology 
The overreaction hypothesis was first applied in finance by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), 
suggest that investors tend to overreact to new information by over weighting recent 
information and under weighting prior information. Overreaction hypothesis implies that 
stocks that perform best (worst) over an initial period tend to perform worst (best) in the 
subsequent period. This is because investors tend to overreact to new information and 
generate such price movements that go beyond the new equilibrium level justified by the 
news.  Later, as investors realize that they have unduly reacted to the information and trade 
on the overreaction, price will change to the opposite direction of the initial movements and 
approached its equilibrium.  
Based on efficient market condition, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) explain overreaction 
hypothesis as: 
 
Where  is the return on security j at time t,  is all information at time t-1,  is 
the market expectation of the return on security j at time t conditional on the information 
assed by the market at time t-1. The efficient market condition states: 
 
Where  equals the mean abnormal returns of winners and  equals that of losers. The 
winners and losers are determined from abnormal positive (negative) returns in the prior 
period. In contrast to efficient market condition, the overreaction hypothesis implies that: 
 
If market has overreacted, the winner portfolio will experience a negative price adjustment 
during the subsequent period and the loser will experience a positive price adjustment during 
the test period.  
The availability of data over a period from January 1987 to December 2006 provides 
19, 9 and 3 non-overlapping 12-month, 24-month and 60-month portfolio formation (rank) 
periods and the corresponding test periods respectively. The subsequent long run rank periods 
and their matching test periods are presented in Table 1.  
This study uses monthly closing price of all stocks listed on the main board of Bursa 
Malaysia collected from the Datastream to calculate for monthly return. Monthly returns are 
computed as: 
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Where, represents return on security i at period t, and  represent price on security i 
at period t and period t -1. The same calculation is carried out for return on market with the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index (KLSE CI) being used as a proxy for the 
market. This study computes monthly market adjusted abnormal return (AR) for stock i as: 
 
Where  and  are returns for stock i and market m, respectively. The study computes 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARi) for every stock over the portfolio formation period (FP) 
of T =12, 24 and 60. 
 
Following De Bondt and Thaler (1985), these stocks are then ranked based on their CARs 
over the formation period and portfolios are formed. Firms in the top 20% are assigned to the 
winner portfolio (W) and in the bottom 20% to the loser portfolio (L). Buying loser and 
selling winner forms arbitrage portfolios. The winner, loser and arbitrage portfolios are then 
held for the next 12, 24 and 60 months.  
In the subsequent test period, the CARs of all stocks in the winner and loser portfolios 
are recomputed. If firm is de-listed in a month subsequent to portfolio formation, it will be 
permanently dropped from the portfolio and the CARs is an average of the available returns. 
For every test period at the interval of 1 and 12, 1 and 24, as well as 1 and 60, the CARs for 
all stocks in the winner and loser portfolios are calculated as follows. 
 
where z is the test period (1,2, ... Z), N is the number of stocks assigned in each portfolio for 
each formation period and  is the cumulative abnormal returns in month t of the test 
period z for portfolio p 
The study then repeats the above method for all formation periods and their 
subsequent test periods of 12-, 24- and 60-month. One sample t-test is used to examine 
whether the loser portfolio and the winner portfolio reverse their fortune in the subsequent 
test period. Negative significant t-values for the winner portfolio would suggest that there is 
evidence of stock overreaction existed in the sample, in which it implies that the winner 
portfolio has reversed and perform significantly badly during the test period. The reverse is 
true for the loser portfolio. Positive significant t-values for the loser portfolio support the 
overreaction hypothesis by suggesting that the loser portfolio has performed significantly 
better in the test period. Meanwhile, positive significant t-value for the arbitrage portfolio 
indicates that contrarian strategy of buying loser and selling winner portfolios would produce 
significant abnormal returns in the subsequent period as suggested by the overreaction 
hypothesis.  
The study also employs the independent samples t-test to ascertain the difference in 
mean cumulative abnormal return (CARs) of the two portfolios over the test period. 
Significant t-values in the differences would suggest that the mean returns of the two 
portfolios are different. A positive significant t-values support the overreaction hypothesis. It 
implies that loser portfolio has outperformed winner portfolio in the test period. 
2.1  Long run overreaction with adjustment to size 
The study extends the investigation of the long run overreaction by controlling for firm size 
to ascertain if the contrarian profits are just due to small firm size effect. The study controls 
for firm size by constructing three sizes sorted groups, which are small, medium, and large 
British Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences                      45 
November 2011, Vol. 2 (2) 
 
 
© 2011 British Journals ISSN 2048-125X 
 
based on market value of the stocks at the end of the formation period. Stocks are first 
assigned to winner and loser portfolio based on rank period return, then each of the loser and 
winner portfolios are broken into three size portfolios of small, medium and large. The 
methodology describes in the previous section is repeated here for the small winner, small 
loser, large winner and large loser portfolios. 
2.2  Long run overreaction with adjustment to time varying risk 
In view of the contention by Chan (1988) that risk associated with a portfolios are more likely 
to change overtime, this study extends the analysis by taking into consideration the aspect of 
time-varying risk. Consistent with Chan (1988), this study assumes that expected returns are 
generated by Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The study also assumes 
that the presence of abnormal returns can be tested via examining the value of α in the 
following equation: 
 
In order to examine the change in risk from the formation period to the test period as well as 
the presence of abnormal returns in the formation period and the test period, the above 
equation is modified slightly to: 
 
Where t is between 1 and 24, Dt is a dummy variable equal to zero in the ranking period (t 
<= 24) and to 1 in the test period (t > 24). The abnormal return in the ranking period is 
estimated by α1i and that of the test period is estimated by α2i. The ranking period risk is βi 
and the test period’s is βi + βiD. If the risk of a portfolio unchanged, then βiD, which indicates 
the change in the risk of the portfolio from the rank to the test period, should be equal to zero. 
Hence, the study investigates if there is any change in the beta of the winner, loser and 
arbitrage portfolios from the rank to the test periods. 
 
3. Findings 
3.1 12-month formation period 
Table 2 and Table 3 summarize results of the differences in CARs between loser and winner 
in the test period for 12-month formation period. Table 2 shows that Malaysian stock market 
significantly overreacts in 6 out of 19 non-overlapping portfolio formation and test period. 
Winner and arbitrage portfolio of loser minus winner exhibit significant reversal behaviour 
that is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis.  
The study also shows that the overreaction behaviour is more pronounced in the 
period prior to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis with 4 out of 6 evidences of stock 
overreaction have taken place during this sub-period. After the crisis, the overreaction 
gradually diminishes and becomes insignificant in period 2003/2004, 2004/2005 and 
2005/2006.  
Table 3 shows that both loser and winner portfolio reversed in the test period. Loser 
portfolio has significantly reversed in month 1 to month2 of the test period while winner 
portfolio has significantly becomes loser in month 11 and month 12 of the test period. 
Arbitrage portfolio earns significantly positive abnormal returns as early as one month after 
portfolio formation. The results however become insignificant after two months of portfolio 
formation. In month 11 of the test period, the arbitrage portfolio significantly earns up to 
7.74% of abnormal returns. The findings suggest that investors have overreacted by 
overvaluing winner portfolio over an initial period and undervaluing the loser portfolio over 
the same period. In the following sub-period, both loser and winner portfolio reversed and 
arbitrage portfolio earns significant abnormal profit. Although the study shows that there are 
opportunity to earn abnormal returns out of contrarian strategy, the results however is 
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marginally significant at 10% significant level. After taken into account the transaction cost, 
the strategy may not be economically profitable. 
 
3.2 24-month formation period 
Table 4 displays results of differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) between loser 
and winner in the test period for 24-month portfolio formation in the Malaysian stock market 
over the period between January 1987 and December 2006. Table 4 presents that five out of 
nine test periods, mean CARs are significantly greater for loser than for winner. These results 
are therefore consistent with the Overreaction Hypothesis. The results also show that loser 
has significantly outperformed winner for portfolio formed before 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis. Those that are formed after the crisis period, however does not consistent with 
overreaction hypothesis where winner portfolio tends to significantly outperformed loser 
portfolio as indicated by the mean CAR of loser - winner. The findings suggest that there 
exist strong overreaction phenomenon in the Malaysian stock market before the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis period. The results are also statistically significant in all the 5 periods before 
the crisis.  
However, after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, evidence of overreaction behaviour 
diminishes. As time goes by, the stock overreaction behaviour gradually diminishes and stock 
market gradually becomes more “efficient”. These patterns are shown in Table 4 where the 
negative zero-investment returns of loser minus winner become insignificant during the 
2001/2002 and 2003/2004 periods. Malaysian stock market seems to be more efficient after 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis period, a results that is consistent with Otchere and Chan 
(2003) for Hong Kong stock market. 
Table 5 reveals that loser has becoming winner by earning positive abnormal returns 1 
month to 2 months after portfolio formation; however the results are not significant. These 
insignificant results of mean difference indicate failing to reject the null hypothesis of ACAR 
= 0. This implies that there is no significant difference in ACAR for loser in the formation 
and the test period. Meanwhile, the winner portfolio displays a reverse in fortune in the 
subsequent period. Results show that winner portfolio has reversed after 13 months of 
portfolio formation. The arbitrage portfolio of selling winner and buying loser earned 
significantly positive ACAR 3.27% within one month after portfolio formation. However, as 
time passing by, the ACAR diminishes and sometimes the strategy gives negative ACAR. 
This suggests that, while confined mainly to the winner portfolio, the overreaction effect does 
provide a trading strategy, which appears to offer the potential for significant trading gains. 
The results are consistent with international evidence where the winner portfolio experienced 
a significant price reversal in the test period. However, the loser portfolio exhibits no such 
behaviour, while the difference in CAR between loser and winner portfolio is also not 
statistically significant. The findings of this study are coherent to those documented by 
Brailsford (1992) for Australian stock market and Ising et. al (2006) for German stock 
market. Furthermore, the findings of the current study are also in accordance with those 
found by McInish et al (2006).  
 In summary, this study finds no clear evidence of stock overreaction hypothesis in 
Malaysian stock market for 24-month portfolio formation period as presented by the 
insignificant results of the arbitrage portfolio.  
3.3 60-month formation period 
Findings of overreaction in stock returns for 5-year formation period are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 shows that stock overreaction behaviour is only significantly evidenced in the period 
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before the crisis. Table 7 presents the results when the CARs are calculated over a 60-month 
period or 5-year period. Findings suggest that there are evidences of stock overreaction 
existed in Bursa Malaysia when CARs are calculated over 60-month periods. Table 7 reports 
that evidences of overreaction behaviour could be detected even after four months up to five 
years of portfolio formation. Notice that evidences of overreaction behaviour are more 
pronounced for winner than for loser portfolio. Loser portfolio exhibits continuation 
behaviour in month 46 to month 51. However, in general the results show that loser portfolio 
has reversed in the subsequent period, which is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. 
This implies that during the formation period, investors have overreacted by unduly 
undervalued extremely losing stocks. In the subsequent period, the prices correct themselves 
once investors realized the misvaluation of those stocks. 
Winner portfolio on the other hand has subsequently reversed in month 4 through 
month 60 of test period. In the case of winner portfolio, investors may have become overly 
optimistic about those stocks and thus, resulting in stock prices being unreasonably 
overvalued. In the following period, after realizing that those stocks had overvalued, 
investors take corrective action and pull their prices down, resulting in the extremely winning 
stocks to earn negative ACAR in the test period. These behaviours are consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis. The overreaction behaviour shown by the winner and loser 
portfolios as described above have given an opportunity for strategy that based on the 
overreaction hypothesis such as contrarian strategy of selling winner and buying loser to earn 
significant positive abnormal returns. Column three of Table 7 presents results of arbitrage 
portfolio of selling winner and buying loser portfolios. Findings reveal that arbitrage portfolio 
starts earning significant positive abnormal returns of 11.8% eight months after portfolio 
formation. As time passes by, abnormal returns earned increases to 20.6%, 54.7%, 39%, 27% 
and 32.42% after 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 years of portfolio formation 
respectively.  
 
4. Adjustment to size 
Results of the study after adjustment to size for 12-, 24- and 60- month formation period are 
presented in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 respectively. The findings suggest that, even after 
adjustment for size, stock overreaction effect still exist for the 12-month and the 60-month 
formation period. Both loser and winner portfolios still exhibit behaviour that are consistent 
with stock overreaction hypothesis. This finding implies that size cannot explain the 
overreaction effect documented by the study. Consistent with international evidence, 
evidence of overreaction behaviour are more pronounced for small stocks than large stocks 
for 60-month formation period. 
 
5. Adjustment to time-varying risk 
Table 11 summarised results of stock overreaction behaviour after adjustment for time-
varying risk for 12-, 24-, and 60-month formation period. Overall, the findings show that 
overreaction effect disappears when risk is taken into account for formation period of 12-
month, 24-month as well as 60-month. The study implies that time-varying risk can explain 
the overreaction effect documented by the study. The abnormal returns earned in the 
subsequent period are enough to compensate the extra risk assumed during the test period.
British Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences                      48 
November 2011, Vol. 2 (2) 
 
 
© 2011 British Journals ISSN 2048-125X 
 
6. Investment implication and conclusion 
Results of the study demonstrate that overreaction behaviour in Malaysia stock market is sensitive to the 
length of the formation period. In shorter formation period of 1-year, the study shows a significant positive 
abnormal return by resorting to contrarian strategy as early as 1-month form portfolio formation. The results 
however are only marginally significant at 10% significant level. The strategy may not be economically 
profitable if transaction cost is taken into account. For the medium term of 2-year formation period, the study 
finds no clear evidence of stock overreaction behaviour existed in the market. In the longer formation period 
namely 5-year formation period, loser and winner portfolio has reversed, and loser has significantly 
outperformed winner portfolio in the test period. These findings lend support to those reported by Saleh 
(2007), and Campbell and Limmack (1997) for Jordon and UK stock market. Their study also find that loser 
continue to be loser in the short term. In the longer term of up to five years, loser portfolio reversed and has 
outperformed winner portfolio. Loser portfolio will continue to be loser in shorter formation period such as 
two-year formation period. However, the significant abnormal returns earned are just enough to compensate 
for higher risk in the test period. 
This study suggests that Malaysian investors are able to earn significant positive abnormal returns by 
resorting to contrarian strategy if they form portfolio based on longer past performance of up to 5-year. 
Significant abnormal returns could be earned as early as eight months from portfolio formation. Although 
contrarian strategy does not provide potential positive abnormal returns, strategy that based on winner alone 
may produce significant gains in the short run. 
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Table 1: Long-run rank periods and test periods for 12-, 24- and 60-month 
 12-month 24-month 60-month 
Period Formation 
period 
Test 
period 
Formation 
period 
Test period Formation 
period 
Test period 
1 1987 1988 1987-1988 1989-1990 1987-1991 1992-1996 
2 1988 1989 1989-1990 1991-1992 1992-1996 1997-2001 
3 1989 1990 1991-1992 1993-1994 1997-2001 2002-2006 
4 1990 1991 1993-1994 1995-1996   
5 1991 1992 1995-1996 1997-1998   
6 1992 1993 1997-1998 1999-2000   
7 1993 1994 1999-2000 2001-2002   
8 1994 1995 2001-2002 2003-2004   
9 1995 1996 2003-2004 2005-2006   
10 1996 1997     
11 1997 1998     
12 1998 1999     
13 1999 2000     
14 2000 2001     
15 2001 2002     
16 2002 2003     
17 2003 2004     
18 2004 2005     
19 2005 2006     
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Differences in CARs between loser and winner in the test period 
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Formation 
Period Test Period 
Mean 
Loser 
Mean 
 Winner 
Mean 
Loser - Winner t-stat 
87 88 -33.63 -9.91 -23.72 -2.267** 
88 89 12.53 7.27 5.26 0.313 
89 90 -1.01 2.71 -3.73 -0.352 
90 91 1.33 -8.13 9.47 1.050 
91 92 -10.45 7.55 -18.012 -1.735* 
92 93 67.44 26.05 41.39 3.087*** 
93 94 16.87 -6.32 23.19 2.457*** 
94 95 -22.36 -8.63 -13.73 -1.744* 
95 96 13.44 11.22 2.22 0.228 
96 97 -60.64 -94.63 33.99 2.606*** 
97 98 43.13 -32.30 75.43 7.677*** 
98 99 -6.78 -9.63 2.85 0.318 
99 00 -18.63 -38.04 19.40 2.151** 
00 01 -15.90 -7.96 -7.94 -1.305 
01 02 -33.68 -9.80 -23.87 -2.237** 
02 03 14.28 3.03 11.25 1.512* 
03 04 -29.98 -34.62 4.63 0.535 
04 05 -47.68 -34.94 -12.73 -1.449 
05 06 10.66 5.82 4.83 0.597 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Table 3: CARs for loser, winner and arbitrage portfolios for 12-month formation  period. 
 Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Month Mean 
Difference 
t-value Mean 
Difference 
t-value Mean 
Difference 
t-value 
1 2.89  1.722* -0.57 -0.352 3.42 1.515* 
2 6.15  1.917* 0.52 0.243 5.63  1.348* 
3 3.17  0.953 -0.14 -0.052 3.31 0.929 
4 2.85 0.848 -0.75 -0.305 3.61 1.251 
5  0.037 0.010 -0.08 -1.029 3.12  0.935 
6 -0.62 -0.169 -2.43 -0.856 1.80 0.527 
7 1.88 0.045 -2.66 -0.851 4.55  1.188 
8 0.82 0.178 -3.50 -1.236 4.33  1.157 
9 1.20 0.217 -3.36 -1.071 4.56 1.031 
10 -0.79 -0.137 -4.68 -1.319 3.88  0.827 
11 0.77 0.114 -15.69 -1.676* 7.74  1.393* 
12 -5.34 -0.754 -12.11 -2.004* 6.76 1.206 
Note: * indicates significant at 10% . 
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Table 4: Differences in CARs between loser and winner portfolios 
 
Formation 
Period 
Test 
Period 
Mean CAR 
Loser Winner Loser - Winner t-value 
87-88 89-90 33.14 6.09 27.09 1.957** 
89-90 91-92 7.53 -27.82 20.29 1.761* 
91-92 93-94 66.31 16.94 49.37 5.073*** 
93-94 95-96 1.10 -13.02 14.19 1.801* 
95-96 97-98 -38.35 -57.22 18.87 1.993** 
97-98 99-00 -37.49 -20.04 -17.45 -2.151** 
99-00 01-02 -35.75 -14.31 -21.44 -2.430** 
01-02 03-04 -15.76 -10.75 -5.00 -0.652 
03-04 05-06 -38.51 -31.45 -7.06 -0.861 
Notes : *,** and *** denotes significant at 10% , 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 5: CARs for Loser, Winner and Arbitrage Portfolios 
 
Month 
Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Mean 
Difference 
t-value Mean 
Difference 
t-value Mean 
Difference 
t-value 
1 1.31 1.267 -1.97 -1.259 3.27 1.623* 
2 2.06 1.030 -1.49 -0.677 3.57 1.327 
3 -1.41 -0.373 -3.31 -1.168 1.90 0.532 
4 -2.59 -0.500 -2.29 -0.966 -0.29 -0.88 
5 -6.00 -0.750 -4.04 -1.076 -1.97 -0.312 
6 -4.05 -0.594 -4.16 -1.104 0.12 0.020 
7 -0.49 -0.068 -3.21 -0.779 2.72 0.494 
8 -0.44 0.058 -0.80 -0.148 1.24 0.195 
9 1.30 0.154 -2.65 -0.495 3.95 0.678 
10 -0.42 -0.045 -2.20 -0.354 1.78 0.227 
11 -2.50 -0.234 -1.74 -0.245 -0.76 -0.071 
12 -6.36 -0.480 -5.00 -0.737 -1.37 -0.101 
13 -7.19 -0.532 -6.75 -1.335 -0.44 -0.035 
14 -0.66 -0.048 -8.16 -1.583* 7.50 0.721 
15 -0.28 -0.022 -9.23 -1.717* 8.50 1.011 
16 0.15 0.011 -5.74 -1.197 5.89 0.591 
17 -2.38 -0.193 -8.91 -1.724* 6.53 0.745 
18 -4.33 -0.360 -9.28 -1.839* 4.96 0.535 
19 -3.79 -0.299 -11.83 -1.893* 8.04 1.046 
20 -5.54 -0.425 -8.08 -1.339 2.54 0.241 
21 -5.22 -0.359 -5.94 -0.906 0.72 0.060 
22 -10.07 -0.674 -9.43 -1.691* -0.64 -0.052 
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Month 
Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Mean 
Difference 
t-value Mean 
Difference 
t-value Mean 
Difference 
t-value 
23 -11.09 -0.670 -10.53 -1.964* -0.56 -0.040 
24 -19.86 -0.993 -13.13 -2.522** -6.73 -0.374 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Differences in CARs for 5-year portfolio formation 
 
Formation 
Period 
Test 
Period 
Mean CAR 
Loser Winner Loser - Winner t-value 
87-91 92-96 47.33 4.88 42.45 2.534*** 
92-96 97-01 -57.99 -93.48 35.49 2.117** 
97-01 02-06 15.39 2.97 18.36 0.815 
Notes : *,** and *** denotes significant at 10% , 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 7: CARs  for 5-Year formation period 
 
Month 
Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Mean 
Difference 
t-value Mean 
Difference 
t-value Mean 
Difference 
t-value 
1 3.24 0.912 0.35 0.306 2.89 1.008 
6 -0.25 -0.046 -1.05 -0.247 0.80 0.180 
12 -6.66 0-.337 -21.23 -0.901 14.57 1.809 
18 19.12 0.625 -20.52 -0.798 39.64 3.406** 
24 40.14 1.185 -13.69 -0.747 53.83 3.207* 
30 19.15 0.785 -14.22 -0.893 33.37 2.460* 
36 21.92 0.683 -13.45 -0.664 35.36 2.831* 
42 1.29 0.047 -18.97 -0.860 20.26 1.888 
48 -8.12 -0.258 -29.08 -0.956 20.96 2.256* 
54 5.46 0.150 -28.07 -0.853 33.53 4.558** 
60 0.86 0.026 -30.34 -0.994 31.20 4.389** 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively. Statistical significant is reduced due to 
smaller size. 
 
Table 8: CARs for 12-month formation period with adjustment to size. 
 
Month 
Loser Winner 
Small Large Small Large 
1 4.40 (1.892*) 1.28 (0.961) 0.69 (0.331) -1.74 (-1.100) 
2 8.77 (2.230**) 3.50 (1.508*) 1.92  (0.682) -1.69 (-0.690) 
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3 4.58 (1.060) 1.93 (0.736) 0.44 (0.116) -3.28 (-1.005) 
4 3.52 (0.842) 2.95 (1.086) -0.73 (-0.192) -4.50 (-1.227) 
5 -0.04 (-0.009) 0.57 (0.184) -3.03 (-0.714) -8.56 (-1.659*) 
6 0.06 (0.015) -1.06 (-0.356) -1.43 (-0.355) -9.83 (-1.494*) 
7 2.29 (0.462) 0.09 (0.028) -0.46 (-0.108) -11.68 (-1.437*) 
8 2.64 (0.455) -1.63 (-0.487) 0.79 (0.170) -15.03 (-1.684*) 
9 2.56 (0.402) -1.31 (-0.362) 2.57 (0.504) -17.23 (-1.857*) 
10 -0.50 (-0.078) -2.64 (-0.641) 4.35 (0.686) -19.70 (-1.931*) 
11 0.54 (0.067) -0.57 (-0.124) 4.09 (0.511) -22.84 (-1.992*) 
12 -5.99 (-0.722) -5.10 (-1.055) -0.40 (-0.042) -29.30 (-2.213**) 
Note: * and ** indicate significant at 10% and 5% respectively 
 
 
Table 9a: CARs for 24-month FP of small firms. 
 
Month 
Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
1 0.38 0.292 1.04 0.476 -0.65 -0.428 
2 0.69 0.266 2.29 0.696 -1.59 -0.504 
3 -1.63 -0.404 -0.34 -0.085 -1.28 -0.362 
4 -1.54 -0.350 -1.07 -0.250 -0.46 -0.157 
5 -2.86 -0.244 -3.07 -0.487 0.21 0.048 
6 -2.15 -0.489 -1.02 -0.156 -1.12 -0.263 
7 2.69 0.508 2.13 0.249 0.56 0.118 
8 4.15 0.607 -0.58 -0.069 4.73 1.105 
9 5.47 0.658 -0.74 -0.080 6.22 1.315 
10 3.51 0.373 -2.47 -0.224 5.99 1.133 
11 3.64 0.317 -3.53 -0.318 7.18 1.177 
12 0.66 0.045 -11.65 -1.047 12.31 1.609* 
13 0.65 0.048 -8.79 -0.793 9.44 1.386 
14 6.52 0.448 -4.91 -0.441 11.43 1.568* 
15 6.27 0.446 -6.02 -0.505 12.29 1.929* 
16 7.78 0.534 -3.81 -0.333 11.59 1.785* 
17 3.88 0.293 -6.95 -0.598 10.83 1.827* 
18 2.13 0.166 -8.71 -0.773 10.85 1.572* 
19 1.65 0.123 -7.29 -0.674 8.94 1.282 
20 1.46 0.103 -7.36 -0.608 8.82 1.163 
21 4.71 0.308 -5.34 -0.430 10.06 1.359 
22 1.86 0.135 -10.03 -0.939 11.89 1.762* 
23 2.60 0.202 -8.99 -0.850 11.58 1.923* 
24 -2.25 -0.169 -14.12 -1.419* 11.87 1.693* 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively 
 
Table 9b: CARs for 24-month FP of large firms. 
 Loser Winner Arbitrage 
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Month Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
1 3.75 1.857* 0.76 0.602 2.99 1.704* 
2 2.21 0.642 2.32 1.030 -0.12 -0.054 
3 -0.99 -0.216 2.49 0.785 -3.48 -0.986 
4 2.16 0.458 1.13 0.455 1.03 0.257 
5 2.60 0.421 -0.76 -0.258 3.37 0.682 
6 4.88 0.945 -0.68 -0.221 5.55 1.093 
7 7.87 1.188 -0.71 -0.233 8.58 1.360 
8 2.27 1.168 -3.29 -1.012 10.57 2.001* 
9 6.34 1.024 -3.88 -1.130 10.23 2.860** 
10 8.34 0.915 -5.23 -1.393 13.58 2.137* 
11 6.72 0.635 -9.40 -1.767* 16.12 2.400** 
12 1.71 0.145 -14.91 -1.738* 16.62 2.611** 
13 7.88 0.493 -14.33 -1.714* 22.21 1.991* 
14 10.81 0.690 -12.18 -1.933* 22.99 1.902* 
15 10.84 0.691 -12.74 -1.970* 23.58 2.004* 
16 11.35 0.761 -12.94 -1.527 24.30 2.398** 
17 7.53 0.523 -15.04 -1.761* 22.57 2.404** 
18 7.41 0.541 -15.60 -1.916* 23.00 2.646** 
19 10.37 0.715 -15.28 -1.933* 25.65 2.752** 
20 7.38 0.580 -14.95 -2.148* 22.33 2.886** 
21 6.35 0.522 -13.29 -1.942* 19.65 2.547** 
22 6.09 0.515 -14.39 -2.213** 20.49 2.702** 
23 9.05 0.822 -11.32 -2.233** 20.37 2.796** 
24 2.90 0.231 -15.67 -2.486** 18.56 2.067* 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively 
 
 
Table 10a: CARs for 60-month FP of large firms. 
 
Month 
Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
1 1.98 0.491 -0.16 -0.201 2.15 0.568 
12 -0.38 -0.403 -11.83 -0.914 11.44 0.761 
18 20.69 0.986 -14.11 -0.877 34.80 1.728 
21 34.83 1.442 -12.71 -0.833 47.55 2.772* 
22 35.73 1.463 -14.52 -0.967 50.25 2.956* 
23 27.62 1.919 -11.40 -0.944 39.01 4.086** 
24 19.90 1.910 -16.08 -1.036 35.98 7.042** 
25 17.98 1.858 -16.62 -1.207 34.60 8.362*** 
26 26.30 1.717 -15.76 -1.111 41.96 36.244*** 
27 20.18 1.371 -17.46 -1.114 37.64 13.552*** 
28 7.82 1.161 -16.47 -1.081 24.28 1.949* 
36 -14.14 -0.994 -12.84 -1.056 -1.29 -0.78 
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Month 
Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
48 -38.75 -2.060* -22.87 -1.039 -15.88 -0.558 
60 -33.07 -6.509* -23.80 -1.049 -9.27 -0.518 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively 
 
Table 10b: CARs for 60-month FP of small firms. 
 
Month 
Loser Winner Arbitrage 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-value 
1 2.60 0.714 -2.21 -1.068 4.82 2.052* 
12 -10.08 -0.387 -34.93 -1.319 24.85 1.624 
18 15.47 0.401 -23.94 -0.761 39.42 2.250* 
24 44.43 1.114 -7.01 -0.301 51.43 3.102* 
30 21.26 0.718 -14.20 -0.675 35.48 2.814* 
36 27.91 0.733 -18.70 -0.685 46.61 4.198** 
42 12.81 0.425 -39.01 -1.909* 51.83 5.294** 
54 18.44 0.439 -55.15 -1.617 73.59 6.237** 
60 21.55 0.606 -52.80 -1.947* 75.96 9.385*** 
Note: *, and ** indicate significant at 10%, and 5% respectively 
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 11: Overreaction effect with adjustment to risk 
  
Aggregat
e 
Loser  Winner Arbitrage 
AR FP AR TP Beta FP 
Change
d in 
Beta fr. 
FP to 
TP   AR FP  AR TP Beta FP 
Change
d in 
Beta fr. 
FP to 
TP AR FP AR TP Beta FP 
Changed in 
Beta fr. FP 
to TP 
12-month 
-5.07 -0.11 1.162 0.10  4.58 -0.41 1.20 -0.12 -9.95 0.35 -0.11 0.272 
(-
12.408)**
* (-0.233) 
(19.470)*
** 
(1.953)*
*  
(14.484)*
** (-1.044) 
(27.118)**
* (-1.389) 
(-
25.258)**
* (-0.088) 
(-
2.687)*** (2.713)*** 
              
 -8.815 -2.75 0.87 0.21  4.98 -0.07 0.92 -0.02 -13.79 -2.40 -0.03 0.24 
24-month 
(-
12.291***
) 
(-
3.282***) 
(19.190**
*) 
(2.471**
)   
(12.209**
*) (-1.391) 
(26.183***
) (-0.118) 
(-
23.908***
) (-1.850*) (-1.2027) (2.244**) 
              
 -1.59 -0.36 1.15 0.21  1.27 -0.35 1.13 -0.10 -2.86 0.00 0.02 0.32 
60-month 
(-
2.734)*** (-0.610) (1.969)** (0.368)  (2.181)** (-0.601) (1.942)** (-0.177) 
(-
4.926)*** (-0.027) 
(3.597)**
* (0.655) 
 
 
 
 
 
